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COWBOYS, CAMELS, AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT — THE FDA’S 
RESTRICTIONS ON TOBACCO 
ADVERTISING
GEORGE J. ANNAS, J.D., M.P.H.
HE Marlboro Man and Joe Camel have be-
come public health enemies number one and
two, and removing their familiar faces from
the gaze of young people has become a goal of
President Bill Clinton and his health care officials.1
The strategy of limiting the exposure of children to
tobacco advertisements is based on the fact that al-
most all regular smokers begin smoking in their
teens. This approach is politically possible because
most Americans believe that tobacco companies
should be prohibited from targeting children in their
advertising.
Shortly before the 1996 Democratic National
Convention, the President announced that he had
approved regulations drafted by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) to restrict the advertising of
tobacco products to children. At the convention,
Vice-President Al Gore told the delegates, “Until I
draw my last breath, I will pour my heart and soul
into the cause of protecting our children from the
dangers of smoking.”2 In a press conference at the
White House immediately following the announce-
ment, Health and Human Services Secretary Donna
Shalala said, “This is the most important public
health initiative in a generation. It ranks with every-
thing from polio to penicillin. I mean, this is huge
in terms of its impact.”3 
No one doubts that a substantial reduction in the
number of teenage smokers would mean a substan-
tial reduction in the number of adult smokers when
these teenagers grow up, and this reduction would
have a major effect on health and longevity. Since al-
most 50 million Americans smoke, the result of re-
ducing the number of young smokers substantially
would indeed be “huge in terms of its impact.” The
real question is not whether the goal is appropriate
but whether the means proposed to reach it are like-
ly to be effective. In this regard, the FDA regulations
may be unsuccessful for either of two related rea-
sons: the implementation of the regulations may not
reduce the number of teenagers who start smoking,




The FDA’s new regulations are designed to reduce
the demand for tobacco products among teenagers,
which is consistent with the goal of the Healthy
People 2000 program to reduce by half (to 15 per-
cent) the proportion of children who use tobacco
products.1,4 The FDA has somewhat modified the
time line: the goal of its regulations is to cut under-
age smoking by half in seven years. Although the
FDA has never before asserted jurisdiction over cig-
arettes or smokeless tobacco, the agency bases its
claim to jurisdiction over these two types of prod-
ucts on its authority to regulate medical devices,
defining cigarettes as a “drug-delivery device.” Of
course, this means that the FDA also defines nico-
tine as a drug. The regulations apply to sellers, dis-
tributors, and manufacturers of tobacco products.
Sellers may not sell cigarettes or smokeless tobacco
to anyone under the age of 18 years and must verify
the age of purchasers under 26 by checking a form
of identification bearing a photograph, in a “direct,
face-to-face exchange.” Exceptions are sales through
mail orders and vending machines located in facili-
ties that persons under the age of 18 years are not
permitted to enter at any time. The distribution of
free samples is also outlawed, as is the sale of ciga-
rettes in packs of fewer than 20 (so-called kiddie
packs). All cigarettes and smokeless tobacco prod-
ucts must bear the following statement: “Nicotine-
delivery devices for persons 18 or older.”1 
The most controversial portions of the regula-
tions deal with advertising. One section outlaws all
outdoor advertising within 1000 feet of public
playgrounds and elementary and secondary schools.
Advertising is restricted to “black text on a
white background.”1 This restriction applies to all
billboards but not to “adult publications.” Such
publications are defined by the regulations as “any
newspaper, magazine, periodical or other publica-
tion . . . whose readers younger than 18 years of
age constitute 15 percent or less of the total reader-
ship as measured by competent and reliable survey
evidence; and that is read by fewer than 2 million
persons younger than 18 years of age.”1 Tobacco
manufacturers and distributors are prohibited from
marketing any item (other than cigarettes or smoke-
less tobacco) that bears a brand name used for cig-
arettes or smokeless tobacco and are prohibited from
offering any gift to a person purchasing cigarettes
or smokeless tobacco products.1 Finally, “no manu-
facturer, distributor, or retailer may sponsor or cause
to be sponsored any athletic, musical, artistic, or
other social or cultural event, or any entry or team
in any event, [under] the brand name [of a tobacco
product] (alone or in conjunction with any other
words).”1 Such events may, however, be sponsored
under the name of the corporation that manufac-
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tures the tobacco product, provided that the corpo-
rate name existed before 1995 and does not include
a brand name.
THE LEGAL CHALLENGE
Tobacco companies have already filed suit to en-
join enforcement of the regulations. According to
FDA Commissioner David Kessler, the FDA decided
to assert its jurisdiction over cigarettes when the sci-
entific community determined that the nicotine in
tobacco products is addictive, and when the FDA
concluded that the tobacco companies were proba-
bly manipulating the levels of nicotine to maintain
their market of addicted users.5 Under the legisla-
tion that gives the FDA its authority, a drug is any
product “intended to affect the structure or any
function of the body.” The FDA contends that cig-
arettes and smokeless tobacco can be properly viewed
as devices for delivering the drug nicotine, because
they meet all three independent criteria for deter-
mining whether a product is a drug-delivery device:
“a reasonable manufacturer would foresee that the
product will be used for pharmacologic purposes
[or] that consumers actually use it for such purposes
[or] the manufacturer expects or designs the prod-
uct to be used in such a manner.”5 
The primary argument of the tobacco companies
is that Congress has consistently refused to give the
FDA jurisdiction over tobacco products, and until
now, the FDA itself has consistently said that it has
no jurisdiction over such products. Moreover, the
companies assert that if the FDA had jurisdiction
over cigarettes as a drug or drug-delivery device,
the FDA would have to ban them as not being
“safe,” which Congress has repeatedly refused to do
or permit.
The second argument used by the tobacco com-
panies, which is the focus of this article, is that the
regulations violate the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution by restricting the right to free speech
in advertising. Congress could vote to give the FDA
authority over tobacco but could not, of course,
change the First Amendment.
THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND 
ADVERTISING
The basic test used to determine whether the gov-
ernment can ban advertising is set out in the Su-
preme Court’s 1980 opinion in Central Hudson Gas
& Electric Corporation v. Public Service Commission
of New York.6 This case involved a regulation that
prohibited electric utilities from advertising to pro-
mote the use of electricity. The court adopted a
four-part test to determine whether this regulation
was constitutional: (1) to be protected by the First
Amendment, the advertising must concern a lawful
activity and not be misleading, (2) for the ban to be
valid, the state’s interest in banning the advertising
must be “substantial,” (3) the ban must “directly ad-
vance” the state’s interest, and (4) it must be no
more extensive than necessary to further the state’s
interest.6 In Central Hudson, the Supreme Court
concluded that although the state had a substantial
interest in energy conservation that was advanced by
the ban on advertising, the ban nonetheless failed
the fourth part of the test. The ban failed that part
because it was overly broad, prohibiting the promo-
tion of potentially energy-saving electric services,
and there was no proof that a more limited restric-
tion of advertising could not have achieved the same
goal. The court suggested, as an example, that a nar-
rower regulation could have required “that the ad-
vertisements include information about the relative
efficiency and expense of the offered services.”
In 1986, in Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates
v. Tourism Company of Puerto Rico, the Supreme
Court upheld a ban on advertisements for casino
gambling in Puerto Rico.7 The court held that this
ban met the four parts of the test in Central Hudson.
Adding that the government could ban advertising
for any activity that it could outlaw, the court said it
would be “a strange constitutional doctrine which
would concede to the legislature the authority to
totally ban a product or activity, but deny to the leg-
islature the authority to forbid the stimulation of
demand for the product or activity through adver-
tising.”7 The court gave a number of other examples
of “vice” products or activities, including cigarettes,
alcoholic beverages, and prostitution, which struck
many in the public health community as warranting
restricted advertising. Of course, fashions change,
and many states now promote and advertise gam-
bling, in the form of lotteries and casinos, as good
for the financial health of the government. Nonethe-
less, in the wake of the May 1996 decision in 44 Liq-
uormart v. Rhode Island,8 the most recent and com-
prehensive case involving free speech in advertising,
it is unlikely that Posadas will continue to be in-
voked. Moreover, the four-part test in Central Hud-
son will be more strictly applied in the future.
THE 44 LIQUORMART CASE
In 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, a liquor retailer
challenged the Rhode Island laws that banned all
advertisements of retail liquor prices, except at the
place of sale, and prohibited the media from pub-
lishing any such advertisements, even in other states.
44 Liquormart had published an advertisement iden-
tifying various brands of liquor that included the
word “wow” in large letters next to pictures of vod-
ka and rum bottles. An enforcement action against
the company resulted in a $400 fine. After paying
the fine, 44 Liquormart appealed, seeking a declar-
atory judgment that the two statutes and the imple-
menting regulations promulgated under them vio-
lated the First Amendment.
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The U.S. District Court declared the ban on price
advertising unconstitutional because it did not “di-
rectly advance” the state’s interest in reducing alco-
hol consumption and was “more extensive than nec-
essary to serve that interest.”9 The Court of Appeals
reversed the decision, finding “inherent merit” in
the state’s argument that competitive price advertis-
ing would lower prices and that lower prices would
induce more sales.10 In reviewing these decisions, the
Supreme Court unanimously found that the state
laws violated the First Amendment, but no rationale
for this opinion gained more than four votes. Justice
John Paul Stevens (who wrote the principal opinion)
began his discussion by quoting from an earlier case
involving advertisements of prices for prescription
drugs:
Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes
may seem, is nonetheless dissemination of information as
to who is producing and selling what product, for what
reason, and at what price. So long as we preserve a pre-
dominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation of our
resources in large measure will be made through numer-
ous private economic decisions. It is a matter of public in-
terest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent
and well informed. To this end, the free flow of commer-
cial information is indispensable.8
Justice Stevens went on to note that “complete
speech bans, unlike content-neutral restrictions on
the time, place, or manner of expression . . . are
particularly dangerous because they all but foreclose
alternative means of disseminating certain infor-
mation.”8 Bans unrelated to consumer protection,
Stevens noted further, should be treated with special
skepticism when they “seek to keep people in the
dark for what the government perceives to be their
own good.” Stevens moved on to apply Central
Hudson’s four-point test. He concluded that “there
is no question that Rhode Island’s price advertising
ban constitutes a blanket prohibition against truth-
ful, nonmisleading speech about a lawful product.”
Stevens also agreed that the state has a substantial
interest in “promoting temperance.”
But can the state meet part three of the test, by
showing that the ban is effective in advancing this
interest? Four justices defined the third part of the
test as requiring the state to “bear the burden of
showing not merely that its regulation will advance
its interest but also that it will do so ‘to a material
degree.’”8 This requirement is necessary because of
the “drastic nature” of the state’s ban: “the whole-
sale suppression of truthful, nonmisleading informa-
tion.” Justice Stevens concluded that Rhode Island
did not meet this requirement and could not do so
without “any findings of fact” or other evidence.
The common-sense notion that prohibitions against
price advertising will lead to higher prices and thus
lower consumption (an assumption made in Central
Hudson) was found insufficient to support a finding
that the restriction of advertising would “significant-
ly reduce market-wide consumption.”8 “Speculation
or conjecture” does not suffice.9 
As for the fourth part of the test, Justice Stevens
concluded that the ban also failed because Rhode
Island did not show that alternative forms of regu-
lation that do not limit speech, such as limiting
per capita purchases or using educational campaigns
that address the problem of excessive drinking, could
not be equally or more effective in reducing con-
sumption. All nine members of the Supreme Court
agreed with this conclusion. Finally, Justice Stevens
(again on behalf of four justices) argued that in Po-
sadas the court had wrongly concluded that since
the state could ban a product or activity, it could
ban advertising about it. He argued that the First
Amendment was much stronger than that decision
implied, noting “We think it quite clear that ban-
ning speech may sometimes prove far more intrusive
than banning conduct,” and thus it is not true that
“the power to prohibit an activity is necessarily
‘greater’ than the power to suppress speech about
it. . . . The text of the First Amendment makes
clear that the Constitution presumes that attempts
to regulate speech are more dangerous than at-
tempts to regulate conduct.”8 Stevens also rejected
the idea that “vice” activities have less protection
from the First Amendment than other commercial
activities, noting that the distinction would be “dif-
ficult, if not impossible, to define.”
FREE SPEECH AND THE FDA 
REGULATIONS
Selling cigarettes and smokeless tobacco to per-
sons under the age of 18 years is illegal in all states,
so advertising to this age group is not protected by
the First Amendment. Nor does outlawing vending
machines that children have access to pose a prob-
lem with respect to the First Amendment. Because
the FDA regulations are intended to apply only to
children and do not foreclose alternative sources of
information, it is impossible to predict with certain-
ty how the Supreme Court will respond to a First
Amendment challenge (assuming the court finds
that the FDA has authority in this area). Nonethe-
less, the areas of primary concern can be identified.
Bans will be subject to a higher standard of re-
view than restrictions. Forms of advertising that are
banned include the distribution of products (other
than cigarettes and smokeless tobacco) with the to-
bacco brand name or insignia on them, the place-
ment of billboards within 1000 feet of playgrounds
and elementary and secondary schools, and the use
of brand names for sporting and cultural events. If
the court adopts the strict version of the third part
of the test in Central Hudson, the FDA will have to
present evidence that these bans will reduce under-
age smoking to a material degree. Moreover, to meet
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the fourth part of the test, which the court unani-
mously found was not met in 44 Liquormart, the
FDA must also show that no other, less restrictive
method, such as antismoking advertising or better
enforcement of existing laws, would work as well.
This will be difficult, especially since the FDA com-
missioner has already said he believes that antismok-
ing advertising is effective in helping young people
understand the risks of smoking and that, after the
publication of its rules, the agency plans “to notify
the major cigarette and smokeless-tobacco compa-
nies that it will begin discussing a requirement that
they fund an education program in the mass me-
dia.”5 The court could decide that a nonspeech ban
should have been tried first.
Restrictions on advertising may be easier to up-
hold, but even they are not obviously permissible.
The tobacco companies spend $6 billion a year in
advertising and promotion, about $700 million of
which is spent on magazine advertisements.11 The
core antiadvertising regulation requires that adver-
tisements on all billboards and in publications that
do not qualify as adult publications be limited to
black text on a white background.1 This is a restric-
tion (not a ban) and does not prohibit the inclusion
of factual information (such as the price of liquor,
which was at issue in 44 Liquormart). The rationale
for these rules is that images in bright colors, of
which Joe Camel is the primary example, entice
children to start smoking or continue to smoke.
Since no objective information is being banned or
restricted, the court may find that such a restriction
need meet only a common-sense test.12 If, however,
the court takes a more sophisticated view of adver-
tising — which is largely focused on image rather
than text — it may well hold that the same rules ap-
ply and that therefore the burden of proof is on the
FDA to demonstrate that such a restriction would
reduce underage smoking to a material degree. No
study has yet been able to show evidence of this ef-
fect. Consistent with the view that “pop art” should
be protected at least as much as text is the view that
advertising images are art forms designed to elicit
certain responses and as such are entitled to at least
as much protection from the First Amendment as
objective information. 
Drastic restrictions on advertising may also be in-
effective or even counterproductive. In Britain, for
example, where both Joe Camel and the Marlboro
Man are outlawed and tobacco advertisers are pro-
hibited from using anything that suggests health,
fresh air, or beauty, creative advertisers have found
other ways to promote tobacco products. Advertise-
ments for Silk Cut cigarettes feature various images
of silk being cut (e.g., scissors dancing a cancan in
purple silk skirts and a rhinoceros whose horn pierc-
es a purple silk cap), and Marlboro advertisements
portray bleak and forbidding western U.S. land-
scapes with the words, “Welcome to Marlboro Coun-
try.” It has been suggested that by using such surreal
images, tobacco advertisers may be appealing to fan-
tasies of death and sexual violence that have a pow-
erful (if unconscious) appeal to consumers.13 Such
imagery may actually have greater appeal for teenag-
ers than Joe Camel. U.S. advertising agencies have
already experimented with black-and-white, text-
only advertisements. One agency proposed that the
required phrase, “a nicotine-delivery device,” can be
used in conjunction with the phrase “.cyber ciga-
rettes” on one line, under the phrase (in larger type)
“pleasure.com” and a sideways smiling face, formed
by a colon, a hyphen, and a closed parenthesis [:-)],
to suggest that nicotine is a pleasure of the cyber-
space age.14 
The FDA knows it has a First Amendment prob-
lem here. In its comments accompanying the regu-
lations, the agency argues that it is not required to
“conclusively prove by rigorous empirical studies
that advertising causes initial consumption of ciga-
rettes and smokeless tobacco.”1 In fact, the FDA
says it is impossible to prove this. Instead, the agency
argues it need only demonstrate that there is “more
than adequate evidence” that “tobacco advertising
has an effect on young people’s tobacco use behavior
if it affects initiation, maintenance, or attempts at
quitting.”1 The FDA’s position follows from the
conclusion of the Institute of Medicine:
Portraying a deadly addiction as a healthful and sensual ex-
perience tugs against the nation’s efforts to promote a to-
bacco-free norm and to discourage tobacco use by chil-
dren and youths. This warrants legislation restricting the
features of advertising and promotion that make tobacco
use attractive to youths. The question is not, “Are adver-
tising and promotion the causes of youth initiation?” but
rather, “Does the preponderance of evidence suggest that
features of advertising and promotion tend to encourage
youths to smoke?” The answer is yes and this is a sufficient
basis for action, even in the absence of a precise and de-
finitive causal chain.13 
The Surgeon General has reached a similar con-
clusion:
Cigarette advertising uses images rather than information
to portray the attractiveness and function of smoking. Hu-
man models and cartoon characters in cigarette advertising
convey independence, healthfulness, adventure-seeking,
and youthful activities — themes correlated with psycho-
social factors that appeal to young people.15 
The Supreme Court may make an exception for
tobacco advertisements because of the clear health
hazards and the use of restrictions instead of bans,
but the extent of the restrictions will have to be
justified. In this regard, the 15 percent young-read-
ership rule for publications is difficult to justify as
either not arbitrary or not more restrictive than nec-
essary. The FDA admits, for example, that its rule
would require the following magazines to use black-
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and-white, text-only advertisements: Sports Illustrat-
ed (18 percent of its readers are under the age of
18), Car and Driver (18 percent), Motor Trend (22
percent), Road and Track (21 percent), Rolling
Stone (18 percent), Vogue (18 percent), Mademoi-
selle (20 percent), and Glamour (17 percent).1 The
FDA seems particularly offended by “a cardboard
Joe Camel pop-out” holding concert tickets in the
center of Rolling Stone.5 (Some Americans might
wish to censor the photograph of a naked Brooke
Shields on the cover of the October 1996 issue as
well, although that image is clearly protected by the
First Amendment.) A 25 percent rule, for example,
would exempt all these magazines.
The FDA justifies the 15 percent rule by arguing
that young people between the ages of 5 and 17
years constitute approximately 15 percent of the
U.S. population and that “if the percentage of
young readers of a publication is greater than the
percentage of young people in the general popula-
tion, the publication can be viewed as having partic-
ular appeal to young readers.”1 A similar argument
can, of course, be made with regard to sporting and
cultural events — some of which may have very few
young people in attendance.15 On the other hand,
the billboard restrictions seem to have a more solid
justification.
Tobacco companies profit handsomely by selling
products that cause serious health problems and
contribute to the deaths of millions of Americans.
There is also little doubt that nicotine is physically
addictive and that it is in the interest of tobacco
companies to get children addicted early, since very
few people take up smoking after the age of 18
years. The FDA admits, however, that it cannot
prove that cigarette advertising causes children to
begin to smoke, and the agency has not tried alter-
native measures, such as strictly enforcing current
laws that prohibit sales to minors and engaging in a
broad-based educational campaign against smoking,
to reduce the number of children who smoke. Until
the FDA either proves that cigarette advertising caus-
es children to start smoking or uses methods of dis-
couraging smoking that stay clear of the First Amend-
ment, bans and restrictions on advertising will raise
enough problems with the First Amendment to en-
sure that they will be tied up in court for years. This
does not mean, however, that no immediate legal ac-
tions can be taken against tobacco companies. In a
future article, I will discuss current trends in litiga-
tion against these companies and assess the likely
impact of antismoking lawsuits on the tobacco com-
panies.
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